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11.1

Introduction

The past few years have seen an explosion of legislative activity around developments in genetics and assisted reproduction. In this chapter we examine
recently passed legislation in Australia and Canada in the area of genetic modification technologies and reproductive genetics. We demonstrate that legislative control in this area has a twofold purpose. Less controversially it is aimed
at providing limits to scientific innovation for the purpose of ensuring safe and
ethical research and experimentation. More controversially it is concerned with
what should be the proper "nature of reproduction' namely, how it happens

(sexually), between whom (a man and a woman, both human), in what kinds of
relationships (heterosexual), such that progeny, the product of reproduction,
inherit the blood/genes (bodily substances) of only two biological progenitors.
It is to this latter purpose that we turn our attention in this chapter, analyzing
the role of law in limiting, determining, and constituting reproductive possibilities in an age of genetic modification. Our focus is on new and potential technologies that enable inheritable genetic modification (1GM) of humans, but we
read these, and their legislative limits, in the context in which they appear medically and legally, namely alongside other assisted reproductive technologies
(ARTs) such as reproductive cloning. We ask what is at stake in the new legislative limits, who benefits, who loses, and what kinds of humans are we left with?

11.2

The nature of reproduction

Beginning in the 1970s, it became routine to screen pregnant women in highrisk groups using blood tests, sonograms, and other, more invasive techniques.
Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS) are now used to detect
fetuses with anomalies, and therapeutic abortions are offered to women whose
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fetuses express chromosomal abnormalities. More recently, people have begun
to use in vitro fertilization (IVF), coupled with preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) and selective abortion. Those who are at a serious risk of passing on an
undesired genetic condition have the option of using PGD to identify embryos
without the condition for implantation.
1GM techniques represent the next stage in ARTs. Instead of aborting affected
fetuses or deciding not to implant those embryos identified as carrying a
genetic mutation, it maybe possible to prevent the development of an affected
fetus through 1GM. While this is only one of the many ways in which 1GM
might be utilized, it is clear that any legislation prohibiting or regulating its use
will impact on reproduction. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the only documented instance of human 1GM that has occurred so far is in the context
of reproduction, namely IVF. Researchers at the Institute of Reproductive
Medicine and Science of St Barnabas in New Jersey undertook a controversial
procedure known as ooplasmic transplantation. The process, which has led to
30 births, is now known to have resulted in children who have a small quantity
of additional mitochondrial DNA not inherited from either parent.' We will
discuss this case in more detail later in the chapter. Legislation in Australia and
Canada has recently made such procedures illegal.'
We argue that regulatory discourses around 1GM inevitably affect the nature
of reproduction. The most common type of 1GM is germ-line modification.
Germ line modification epitomizes the connection between reproduction and
genetics as it is conventionally understood. It involves the manipulation of
genetic material in the germ cells themselves, that is, the reproductive cells of an
organism, the sperm, and egg cells. Germ-line modification can also include, in
some definitions, the early 8-cell stage embryo which, when genetically altered,
will probably develop with that alteration in all its cells including the germ
cells. It may also refer to the cells of the embryo that will ultimately develop into
the sperm or egg cells. The technique to which germ-line modification is often
ethically, socially, and scientifically compared is somatic cell gene transfer
(SCGT) which, it is argued, affects only the individual being treated.
The view that somatic cells and germ-line cells are not only distinct but have
completely different trajectories is sometimes offered as scientific fact. Somatic
cells, it is said, cannot be passed from one generation to another and therefore
have a finite life. Germ-line cells, on the other hand, have the potential to be
endlessly passed along to future generations. On the basis of this scientific distinction, some ethicists and state regulatory regimes make an ethical distinction between interventions that modify the germ line compared with those
that modify somatic cell lines. SCGT is viewed as less problematic since, it is
argued, only the person who is the subject of the intervention can hope to benefit from it (or be harmed by it) now and in the future. We suggest, however,
that the distinction relies on a particular construction of identity and reproduction that need not be, and should not be, assumed. Take for instance the
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example offered by W. French Anderson, an advocate of SCGT. He describes the
difference as follows:
Inserting a gene into somatic cells affects only the patient being treated, similar to when
a patient undergoes surgery, takes a medication, or receives a limb prosthesis. However,
with germ-line gene therapy (GLGT), a gene is inserted into the DNA of an egg or sperm
so that children of the patient will have the inserted gene.'
Despite the apparent simplicity of the statement that SCGT affects only the
patient being targeted, the kind of therapy that Anderson himself proposes
belies it. He intends to cure adenosine deaminase (ADA) deficiency by a direct
injection of a retroviral vector carrying a normal copy of the human ADA gene
into 13-15-week fetuses. Of course there is no way to "directly" inject a 13-15week fetus. Rather, injection must occur indirectly through the mother's body.
Clearly, then, at least in the case of in utero SCGT, it is nonsense to suggest
that only the individual who is being treated is affected." It would be easy, of
course, to dismiss this as irrelevant because the essential distinction is at the cellular level. However, this distinction relies on a molecularization of human
identity that is not appropriate. In the case of a pregnant woman, there is no
separate person until the fetus is born. Up until that time, even though there
may be the capacity to identify different cellular components, those components are nevertheless inextricably integrated. The relationship has been
described by one of us (1K) as "not-one-but-not-two. "5 Somatic individuals
then are not always just that.' The erasure of the female body and person in
both scientific and legal discourse about genetics is something we find very
troubling, particularly when the link is made between genetics and reproduction. We will return to this point in our examination of the legislation in
Australia and Canada.
Scientific facts then are themselves disputable. The purported factual distinction between SCGT and 1GM is itself founded upon assumptions about the
"nature of reproduction." For instance, arguments made by John Harris suggest
that were we to permit reproductive cloning, the factual distinction between
GLGT and SCGT would be undermined by the capacity to turn those very
same somatic cells into germ cells:
inserting the mature nucleus of an adult cell into a de-nucleated egg turns cells thus
formed into germ-line cells. This has three important effects. First, it effectively eradicates
the firm divide between the germ-line and somatic-line nuclei because each adult cell
nucleus is, in principle, "translatable" into a germ-line cell nucleus by transferring its
nucleus and creating a clone. Secondly, it permits somatic line modifications to human
cells to become germ-line modifications If you cloned a permanently genetically
modified bone marrow cell the modified genome would be passed to the clone and
become part of his or her genome, transmissible to her offspring indefinitely through the
germ-line The third effect is that it shows the oft asserted moral divide between germline and somatic-line therapy to be even more ludicrous than was previously supposed .7
...

...

...

...
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In an attempt to overcome the limits of this distinction, scientists and others
now refer to 1GM rather than using the more limited term "germ-line modification." Mark Frankel states, for instance, that 1GM "encompasses modifications both of nuclear and of extra-nuclear genomes, and modifications that
are inadvertent side effects of other, deliberate genetic interventions (of, for
example SCGT)." The moral divide becomes that between heritability and
non-heritability, which in turn becomes the basis of a distinction embedded in
recent legislation in Australia and Canada.
The purported ethical or moral distinction that has been erected rests on
assumptions about the "nature" of reproduction. As we noted at the outset, legislative impulses are also geared towards ensuring that the old parameters of
reproduction, so-called "natural reproduction," continue to be mapped across
new technological possibilities and provide appropriate limits. These parameters include the requirement that reproduction is sexual meaning, between a
man and a woman (not cloning) and that the man and the woman are in a heterosexual relationship (some countries and jurisdictions have legislated to limit
the use of IVF and related technologies to heterosexual couples) with each other,
and that, the product of that technologically-enhanced reproduction, has a
blood/genetic line that only traces back to two progenitors.
Kinship relationships and relationships of inheritance are established on the
basis of this truth about the nature of reproduction, such that it becomes
impossible
mposs ble to think about kinship being established, or reproduction taking
place, in other ways. Changes that come about by so-called "natural" reproduction are not viewed with the same kind of anxiety as those brought about artificially and with direct intervention,
The idea of natural reproduction itself has shifted, however, with the advent
of new technologies. New ARTs, such as IVF and artificial insemination (Al),
once considered unnatural and interventionist, have become accepted forms of
natural reproduction (in part because they mimic sexual reproduction) although
many legislatures have been at pains to ensure that only heterosexual couples
use them.' Human 1GM is the latest source of insecurities about the impact of
technology in the realm of reproduction. It has become aligned with transgressive reproductive practices and technologies such as cloning, the creation of
human/non-human hybrids, and the creation of chimeras. 1GM, like other ARTs,
challenges us to rethink the normativity of the established relations of conception, gestation, and in vivo reproduction, in other words, to question the very
"nature" of reproduction.
Genetic and reproductive technologies force us to rethink not only the limits of the possible in reproduction, but also the boundaries of what it is to be
human. The anthropologist Sarah Franklin describes how our sensibilities have
already shifted significantly when we can view "a cryopreserved embryo suspended in a liquid nitrogen tank (as) a biological relative/' as do many couples
undergoing IVF. Franklin describes this as "kinship shorn of a sense of natural
-
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limit, but (maintaining) surely a sense of relatedness based on shared bodily
substances and genetic ties. iO
The anthropologist David Schneider has suggested that "kinship is whatever
the biological relationship is. If science discovers new facts about biogenetic
relationships then that is what kinship is and was all along." Implicit in
Schneider's understanding of the relationship between biology and kinship is
the existence of a pre-discursive nature or biological order that is revealed as
our scientific understanding becomes more sophisticated. On this view, then,
not only do we, as Franklin describes the position, "embody scientific knowledges" in that "they describe the nature of our very being"", but our conceptions of relatedness or kinship also spring into being when scientific knowledge
or natural facts are "discovered." Within this framework, kinship is the "social
construction of natural facts." While we do not agree with the relationship
between kinship and biology described by Schneider, his account certainly characterizes much of the current Euro-American understanding about the relationship between the "facts" of sexual reproduction and the biological kinship
relations it produces. As argued elsewhere by one of us (RIvI):
by presuming that biological ties and the "facts of life" exist [and are fixed], we have
ate a strong rationale for foundational arguments which favor the "naturalness" of
family and kinship relations. What has been construed within our understanding of kinship as natural, then, is a normatively essentialist position having direct bearing upon
the way we understand gender and sexuality within the reproductive context. 14
.
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The biological kinship relation, as described above, is thrown into sharp relief,
when as Franklin puts it, "science discovers new facts about biogenetic relationship." For instance, when science discovers new facts that allow a human to
be crossed genetically with a pig or a mouse, we must ask whether this alters
our cultural conception of who we may call kin. And what are we to make of the
way that such new relations also challenge our commonly held understandings
of "natural" limits? In an ironic twist, as Franklin suggests, "the very ways in
which we are today connected and related through biology undoes the very fixity the biological tie used to represent."
When biological science is deployed to disturb the familiar categories of relation and identity, it troubles mainstream understandings of the role of "scientific truth." Underlying all this s a profound discomfort about the connection
between relationship and identity. There is a kind of pervasive anxiety that
identity can only be secure if relationships are fixed. Up until now this fixity
was assured by the belief that biogenetic relationships were "found' revealed in
"nature' and not made. We suspect this anxiety stems from the latent threat to
liberal notions of identity and individuality bound up with explicit recognition
of the inevitability and inescapabiity of relationship. This concept of inevitability is only acceptable when it can be removed from the realm of choice and
instead firmly ascribed to a very particular construction of "nature" that favors
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the liberal subject but yet, in the lexicon of naturalness, is beyond our capacity
to influence or change.
From this perspective, as 1GM has the potential to create new kinds and
forms of biological kinship, it may also encourage us to revise kinship along
radically different lines. In our view, we must not recreate the errors of past
legal and social reasoning by attempting to "find" kinship on the basis of
processes at the cellular or molecular level. Kinship is, and should be, based on
social relationships established by embodied persons. The fear that motivates
legislative prohibitions of 1GM is based on the spurious construction of human
kinship on the basis of invisible processes at the sub-cellular level.
Legal developments that prohibit and regulate the panoply of technologies
associated with (or dreamed of) as emanating from recent successes in cloning,
stem cell research, and embryonic and gene therapy attempt to reinstate the very
limits of the human that Franklin describes as no longer present or at least
under threat. Our focus is on the appropriateness of this role for law and why it
might be utilized to these ends. The legal scholar Derek Morgan sees the role of
law in this context as twofold: first, "not just as an autonomous body of knowledge, but as a factor that contributes to which, indeed, facilitates the so called
public understanding of science." At the same time, law has a role in declaiming
"who we are and whom we want to become, giving a moral and symbolic
emphasis to law 16 The aim of the current chapter is to make sense of the current legislative fixation with policing the limits of heritability and coextensively,
we argue, with declaring what kind of human (or perhaps post-human) may be
reproduced. It will become clearer just what those limits are understood to be
when we examine the legislation in detail. In addition, we contend that feminists
should look more closely at the way in which science is being deployed to construct law, and probe more carefully what norms of reproduction are being read
into law.
It is imperative, for instance, to consider the position of women in the context
of these recent regulatory moves. As we shall see, while much of the legislation
that has been passed recently or proposed in this area concerns interventions
involving embryo implantation and the manipulation of egg cells, there is little
or no mention of the female body or female persons within the legislation itself,
particularly in the case of Australian legislation. The Canadian legislation is
notable for its specific recognition of the role that women play in reproduction.
In the Assisted Human Reproduction Act discussed in detail below, a set of principles are articulated. 17 Principle c states: "while all persons are affected by these
technologies, women more than men are directly and significantly affected by
their application and the health and well-being of women must be protected in
the application of these technologies." In both cases what is overtly policed is the
fertility of the scientific imagination. As we shall argue, more often than not the
body as flesh is unhinged from any self. In this chapter, we offer an alternative
feminist legal response that does not reify a specific construct of nature.
-

-

The initial and most intriguing question, however, is the following: what is
it about technologically-induced 1GM that could call an unusual coalition of
feminists and conservatives into being and get them to push collaboratively for
legislative change?

11.3 What's wrong with artificial inheritable change?
A large cohort of feminists, disability activists, and progressive thinkers are lining up with moral conservatives to argue for the legal prohibition of human
1GM and cloning technologies. To the extent that their reasoning derives from
concerns that human cloning and 1GM may promote unethical experimentation on women and children, and that both are grossly underdeveloped and
even dangerous, it is clear the argument is unimpeachable. Feminists are on
firm ground opposing unauthorized experimentation on the bodies of women
and children in the name of genetic technology and scientific development.
But why is a general prohibition favored, rather than a regulatory regime in
which practice and research is subject to ethics approval? In both Australia and
Canada, medical practice and scientific research are governed by ethical guidelines applied by university, hospital, and other institutional ethics committees.
In the case of publicly-funded research, research funding is dependent on
requisite approval by the relevant ethics committee and adherence to professional and regulatory guidelines. In the case of 1GM, it is clear that even if the
research or practice was shown to be safe and developed in accordance with
approved ethical guidelines, it would nevertheless be argued that it should be
prohibited. In other words, the concern here is not just with safe and ethical
conduct of experiments and medical treatment on humans. Instead, 1GM is
seen in and of itself as a moral wrong.

11.3.1 Designer babies: simply unnatural?

A number of feminist commentators have argued that the use of 1GM will alienate women from the reproductive process. It would, they argue, fundamentally
undermine maternal autonomy and result in market control of baby design and
production.1' Further, there is a fear that genetic technologies will go beyond
"therapeutic" purposes to prevent the inheritance of lethal genetic diseases in
families and rather be used to "improve' as Frankel writes, "human traits that
without intervention would be within the range of what is commonly regarded
as normal, or improving them beyond what is needed to maintain or restore good
health."" Desirable characteristics will be chosen not by governments, as they
were in eugenic programs of the past, but by individuals exercising free choice
to enhance the life chances of their offspring. The offerings of the marketplace
-

-
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will create the citizen with the best advantage in the global marketplace: the
compliant corporate citizen.
Disability activists perceive the idea of "enhancement" as fundamentally flawed
in its overvaluation of certain traits and undervaluation of others. 20 They rightly
point out that discourses and practices aimed at enhancement reinforce an individualized and medicalized model of disability, rather than locating disability in
a network of exclusionary attitudinal, environmental, and economic barriers .21
Moreover, as the President's Council on Bioethics in the U.S.A. noted: "both
enhancement and therapy are bound up with, and absolutely dependent on, the
inherently complicated idea of health and the always controversial idea of normality... The distinction rests on the assumption that there is a natural human
"whole" whose healthy functioning is the goal of therapeutic medicine. 1112 Kerry
Taylor and one of us (RM) have argued that:

who can afford to buy them",` and implies that natural advantages are neutral
and have no impact on social justice and equity. Obviously, it needs to be asked
how heritable advantages came to be "advantages" in the first place.
In addition to this implicit valorization of the natural, some radical feminist
critiques explicitly rely upon it. They critique various forms of reproductive
technologies as fundamentally disruptive of the natural and proper link
between the woman and her maternal identity.27 However, the problem with
this sort of argument is, as Margrit Shildrick writes, that "it assumes certain
it implicitly counterposes natural with technofixed modes of female being
[and] relies on a closure of identity that in fact may
logical reproduction
inhibit women's interests."28

"Normalcy" is used to rationalize medical attempts to eradicate our differences, and to
render all bodies alike healthy and interchangeable
It is conceivable that genetic
enhancements of normal human functions, if sufficiently valuable and widespread,
might lead us to revise upward our conception of normal species functioning, with the
result that where we draw the line between health and disease, and hence between
enhancement and treatment, would correspondingly change. If this occurred, we might
come to view certain interventions as being required by justice if such enhancements
became widespread we might come to regard a person who lacked them as suffering
from an adverse departure from normal functioning 23 The normal is a cultural and biological imperative, which represents the average, both physically and morally. It also is a
means to justify and preserve the status quo. The "average man" [sic] was constructed
based on the average of all human attributes in a given country.24 Thus, the average bod
became the ideal against which all others are measured. All variations within bodies
became characterized in terms of variation from the normal state
It also creates the
existence of deviations from that norm or, when applied to the body as the site of idem
tity, the presence of "abnormal" persons within a population. In addition to being a
quantitative marker of human variability, the normal is a powerful normative tool that
is used to determine and rationalize the extent to which certain persons fall outside the
boundaries of moral responsibility.25

Having argued that the problem with genetic enhancement technologies is that
they have a differential impact in terms of equity, it should be noted that feminist
and progressive thinkers are also critical of the accuracy of this kind of determinist genetic discourse. In other words, in the act of formulating a considered
response to the claims being made regarding what is scientifically possible, one
quickly falls into the trap of accepting the outcome (i.e., genetically-enhanced
individuals) as a concrete possibility. Critical pressure must also be brought to
bear on this assumption. A focus on genetic enhancement could, as Frankel
lead us to devalue various social and environmental factors that
suggests,
influence human development in concert with genes." Further, as he cautions, "a
preoccupation with genetic enhancement may place too much emphasis on the
genes and ultimately prevent us from solving problems that are really embedded
in the structure of our society.1129
At various times in the history of genetic research, claims have been made
about possible indicators, markers or genetic identifiers for things such as alcoholism, homosexuality, violence, criminality, and so on. The effect of these
kinds of claims has been to displace or dismiss more speculative, analytical discourses such as psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. We
need to remind ourselves that what we understand as "criminal' for example,
is indeed academic. It is a concept that only makes sense within the sociological discourse that produced it. Genetic discourse borrows from the social sciences, identifies particular sociological traits as genetic, and then looks for a
gene. Traits such as violence, intelligence, and so on, are treated as if they have
a kind of scientific actuality without subjecting them to interpretive work.
Richard Lewontin reminds us, however, that "science, like other productive
activities, like the state, the family, sport, is a social institution completely integrated into and influenced by the structure of all our social institutions."30
Claims about genetic modification and what can be achieved thus must be
viewed as contingent, always contestable, and remarkably political.

-

...

...

...

It is not surprising then that feminists, disability activists, and other progressive
thinkers are concerned about the deleterious social and justice impacts of
enhancement technologies associated with 1GM. However, we need to ask
whether there is anything new in the differential distribution and valuation of
particular traits. Or, is the difference in the case of 1GM one of luck versus
design, nature versus artifice? The legitimate concern described above veers into
dangerous terrain, when the defense of human rights, especially women's rights,
is conflated with the defense of "nature." Typical objections about enhancement
seem to fit that bill. This occurs for instance, when feminists including Judith
Levine are concerned that "genetic engineering designs in inequality' She argues
that genetic engineering "will artificially confer heritable advantages only on those

...

...

11,3.2 The critique of genetic determinism
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11.3.3 What is so distinctive about 1GM?

11.3.4 The common heritage pool

Responses to 1GM must also be read against the technologies that currently
exist and are legal. \Nhy does 1GM generate more concern than existing technologies that demand what some have termed "responsible" reproduction
through selective abortion? Put another way, these arguments, while important, are not distinctive to 1GM but are equally applicable to a wider range of
practices that affect somatic cells. Nikolas Rose argues, for instance, that "by the
start of the twenty-first century, hopes, fears, decisions and life-routines shaped
in terms of risks and possibilities in corporeal and biological existence had
come to supplant almost all others as organizing principles of a life of prudence, responsibility; and choice."" Technologies such as CVS, amniocentesis,
and PGD are becoming routine, particularly for pregnant women over the age
of 35. Then why does the specter of changing the germ-line animate legislatures
to act prohibitively?32
One argument for the differential response is offered by Frankel, who claims
that:

Another argument developed (and later discounted) by Mark Frankel and
Audrey Chapman in their report assessing the ethical and social implications of
human 1GM is that future generations have a right to inherit an unmodified
gene pool because the gene pool represents their "genetic patrimony" as the
"common heritage of our species."" The Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights seems to accord with that position, for instance
when it states in Article 1, that:

enhancement by genetics is
qualitatively different from enhancement by other
means. Existing methods of enhancement are not biologically intrusive in a manner
that will significantly shape our evolutionary course. Inheritable genetic enhancement
would have long-term effects on persons yet to be born. Thus we have little, if any, precedent for this way of using 1GM We would be venturing into unknown territory, but
without any sense of where the boundaries should lie, much less with an understanding
of what it means to cross such boundaries .33
...

...

But we routinely make decisions that will have long-term consequences on persons yet to be born we make decisions to procreate and give life to individuals without their consent (the adolescent refrain "I never asked to be born" is
evidence enough). We routinely alter environments with irreversible consequences (think of any number of activities pollution, building high-rises,
sending rockets to the moon), and intervene in political activities, but because
these are changes to the environment, they are somehow less constitutive of
the individual, somehow less integral to identity. Not only are environmental
factors significant on their own, but the new genetics itself reveals the extent
to which phenotypes result from complex interactions between genes and
environment. This should caution us to investigate what resides at the intersection of genes and environment, and not to focus on one over the other. What
Frankel's words indicate instead, we suggest, is an alarmist concern with the
scrutiny of boundaries and the dangers of boundary transgression. In our view,
this anxiety stems from fears about the vulnerability of bounded notions of the
liberal self in the face of new genetic combinations. Later in this chapter, we
return to this central anxiety which motivates much of the legislation in the
area and claims for law the role of policing those boundaries against unnatural34 transgression.
-

-

The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense,
it is the heritage of humanity.36
Frankel and Chapman also point to the claim made in the resolution adopted
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on genetic engineering, which states that:
the rights to life and lo human dignity protected by Articles 2 and 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights imply the right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not
been artificially changed .37
In response to this argument, Frankel and Chapman insist that:
The human gene pool is a heuristic abstraction, not a natural object and lacks a material
referent in nature. Individuals inherit a specific set of genes derived from their parents.
Thus from a biomedical perspective, there is no intergeneration "human germ line" that
could serve as an asset to the future. 38
A single human gene pool is, as Frankel and Chapman suggest, a linguistic artifice. Yet, there is no doubt that the introduction of inheritable genetically-modified
genes will impact on future generations even if only in a miniscule way. It is
therefore more useful to think about the modifications themselves as comprising
a small pool of genetic resources. Viewed in this way, the concern shifts from one
of changing or harming the human gene pool, to one about accessing or controlling the reservoir of genetic material that can be drawn upon to make required
modifications. Assumptions should not be made, however, about likely preferences for particular types of genetic modifications. It would be easy to take the
view that modifications that correct serious illness should be publicly available
and distinguished from those which are merely enhancing and socially desirable.
Indeed, one can imagine the latter forming part of a new commodity culture.
However, in our view even this broad distinction is fraught with serious ethical concerns. The line between these two criteria will always be determined at
the level of context and situated desire. For instance, while some might consider that deafness is an illness that should be corrected, others may view deafness as an enhancement.39 Consider for instance the case of a deaf lesbian couple
in the U.S.A. who deliberately created a deaf child: Sharon Duchesneau and
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Candy McCullough used their own sperm donor, a deaf friend with five generations of deafness in his family, to ensure the birth of a deaf child. They argued
that deafness was a defining factor in their cultural identity.4° In light of examples
such as this one, it is far more likely that any market in technologies for 1GM will
be niche-driven rather than a resource for some non-existent entity called "the
common humanity." On the contrary, it is likely that corporations will compete
to market genetic traits that serve specific groupings of individuals.
11.3.5 Reproductive agency for women

a

t;

What about the argument that 1GM as a new reproductive technology; like
those that have gone before it, is a tool for women that offers them greater control and agency in the reproductive process? These women, it is suggested,
would otherwise see themselves as subject to their reproductive biological fate.
It is clear that "reproductive choice" is another one of those ideas like health,
normality, and naturalness, whose meaning shifts with the technology. Some
feminists, including Abby Lippman, see the plethora of "choice" as artificially
manufacturing needs. She suggests that women will find themselves increasingly subject to external notions of responsibility and risk avoidance.4' As each
new technological advance is seamlessly incorporated into the experiential
matrix of the pregnant woman, it becomes internalized and naturalized, and
new demands to reproduce responsibly follow. Rose argues for instance that
In advanced liberal democracies, biological identity becomes bound up with more general norms of enterprising, self-actualising, responsible personhood.42
Importantly, however, Rose goes on to argue that the new biomedicine is not
individualizing to the extent that "at risk' groups are joining into groups and
organisations, not merely demanding public provision and rights but making
their own claims on the deployment of biomedical technologies and the direction of biomedical research ."43 He sees a contradiction in the new legal species
of human rights based on simple existence, or what he terms "biological citizenship." While such rights suggest each human life is of equal worth, he notes
that these rights have to be read against an equally powerful "biological ethics
and genetic responsibility." According to Rose:
As biomedical technique has extended choice to the very fabric of vital existence, we are
faced with the inescapable task of deliberating about the worth of different human lives
this politics is not one in which authorities claim or are given the power to make such
judgments in the name of quality of the population or the health of the gene pool. On the
one hand, in the new forms of pastoral power that are taking shape in and around our
genetics and our biology, these questions about the value of life itself infuse the everyday
judgments, vocabularies, techniques and actions of all those professionals of vitality: doctors, genetic counsellors, research scientists and drug companies among them, and entangle them all in ethics and ethnopolitics. And, on the other hand, the politics of life itself
-

-

poses these questions to each of us in our own lives, in those of our families and in the new
associations that link us to others with whom we share aspects of our biological identity. 44
-

Recent legislative interventions in Australia and Canada do, however, suggest
that the authorities are claiming a right to make judgments about the worth of
different human lives. Indeed, a new tension is emerging between an ethic of
choice where, with our internalized responsibilities, we make decisions about
our genetic futures that may or may not have us becoming trans- or posthuman, and a human rights of genetics, where governments at the national and
international level take control of human futures by determining for us the
outer limits of how and with whom we may reproduce. In other words, human
rights instruments seem more concerned with policing the outer limits of the
human than protecting those that are born in excess of those limits.
A vignette, recounted recently in the Village Voice, helps to illustrate this
point. A story about "supertots and frankenkids" reminds us that while we may
be approaching that day when wealthy parents may pay to have genetic
"enhancements" to their progeny, the law is currently more concerned about
"banning their birth than in protecting their interests."45 There is no guarantee
that prohibiting the creation of specified biological entities will, in fact, prevent
the feared experiments from occurring. It is possible, instead, that the legislative
ban might have the perverse effect of prejudicing the interests of the persons or
entities born of such experimentation, thus denying them the status of humans
and depriving them of the enjoyment of any ancillary rights. As the Village Voice
article points out, this is the future conjured up by the comic strip and movie
"X-Men" and is modeled on the treatment meted out today to undocumented
aliens, illegal migrants, or, in the past, to women, African slaves, aboriginal peoples, and people of color generally. While science looks forward, law looks backwards. 46 Law is more effective in determining and allocating interests than it is
at defining possibilities in the real world. It is better at defining "illegitimate" offspring than in preventing them from coming into the world .41 Policing natural
reproduction ends in policing the persons that result from unnatural (transgressive) reproduction. According to Erik Baard, "the rights of such unusual
progeny are being curtailed before the people even exist. "4' Far from drawing
actual limits on nature and science then, statutory prohibitions that police the
boundaries of the human end up determining who we may call kin.
We want to suggest that legal and regulatory responses to 1GM ought to
embrace "the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and
opening up new ways of thinking about what being human means .114' In order
to understand why this is important to a feminist legal ethic, we need to recognize that, to date, a legal, liberal conception of the human person has prevailed
that applies only to a fraction of the population, namely those who can operate
as autonomous selves who are actualizing beings because they have the financial resources, the power, and the time to enact themselves in such a way.
-
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As we suggested previously, we need to be wary of collusion between science
and law in the effort to freeze the meanings of categories and remove them
from social contestation. Science is often deployed to place facts beyond dispute, while law is deployed to place disputes under restraints. Both may be
deployed to "reproduce" the bounded notions of the liberal self.
While feminist responses are, for the most part, aware and critical of the limits of liberal selfhood, in some instances as noted above they fail to move away
from a hidden discourse of the natural. In line with feminist legal theorists such
as Martha Fineman, we argue that a particular conceptualization of natural
maternity operates for liberal individuals as a hidden repository of all its
dependencies.5° The truth of liberalism is that no one is a truly autonomous or
independent self, but some lay claim to that status by masking or privatizing
their dependencies. Most commonly, this is done through supportive family
structures. Therefore we are suspicious of moves that seem to be legislating a
particular kind of reproduction on the basis that it most closely replicates the
"natural" and results in "natural reproduction."
It is interesting in this light to compare the Australian legislation with its
Canadian counterpart. The former was introduced under the auspices of one
of the most conservative governments in Australia's history. The latter has been
developed with significant input from and participation by feminist thinkers
and the women's health community. As will become evident in our examination
of the legislation whereas the Canadian legislation appears to place limits on
asexual and species-transgressing reproduction (animal/human), the Australian
legislation also prohibits any kind of reproduction that cannot be seen to mirror,
in some way, heterosexual monogamous reproduction. On the conservative
side, then, there seems to be a panic about the loss of the autonomous liberal
subject that "natural" reproduction operates to shore up.5'

11.4 The legal response in Australia
Prior to the recent legislative developments in Australia prohibiting cloning
and regulating embryo research, significant energy was put into legislative provisions that would regulate the control, access, and use of genetic information.52 The primary outcome of several years' debate over specific (and now
defunct) legislation, the Genetic Privacy and Non Discrimination Bill 1998 (Cth.),
was a 400-page report by the Australian Law Reform Commission recommending, in large part, enhancement of the existing federal and state privacy legislation to manage the use of genetic information. Protecting privacy, rather than
property, is the preferred approach, which is justified on the ground that cornmodification of the human body is a moral wrong. Human dignity, it is argued,
demands that we do not treat the body as property.
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There is no doubt that information about our genetic profile joins us to others. Each person's unique genetic code perversely reveals who else we are our
familiarly distributed network of identity markers and who else we might
become the myriad future pathologies lurking down the track. In a sense, then,
this is the moment when the liberal individual must face his or her interconnected status. Privacy legislation is a knee-jerk response to the necessary vulnerability we feel when we realize that we are all interconnected. Nevertheless, it
cannot work. Under a privacy model, each member of a family not only has the
right to choose not to reveal information about themselves but also the right to
disclose if they so wish. Disclosure will, however, usually reveal something about
other genetically-related family members. Therefore, a different kind of response
is required that protects against the discrimination to which the revelation
might give rise, rather than protecting against the revelation itself. In the same
way, recent legislation around 1GM appears to be aimed at protecting the liberal
individual not by ensuring safe and ethical conduct of ARTs involving gene therapies, but by prohibiting the therapies themselves. How should we understand
this prohibitory legislation? We suggest that in Australia, this legislation is primarily aimed at preserving what has come to be imagined as a kind of "natural
maternity," which acts ideologically to preserve the supportive sexual unit for the
usually male liberal individual, namely, the heterosexual, monogamous, nuclear
family unit.
The new comprehensive Australian federal and state legislation passed over the
course of 2002-2004 consists of two primary Acts: the Prohibition of Human
Cloning Act (Cth.) and the Research Involving Human Embryos Act (Cth.). Each
of the state Acts is a reiteration of the federal legislation.53 The state legislation is
necessary to overcome possible Constitutional limits on the power of the federal
government to regulate in this area, and ensure national uniformity. It should be
noted at the outset that both Acts provide for a review of their operation as soon
as possible after the second anniversary of the day on which the Act received the
Royal Assent. A review committee was appointed on 17 June 2005. The committee must present their report to Parliament by 19 December 2005. The review of
both Acts must be undertaken concurrently and by the same persons. 54
The Commonwealth Acts should be read together with the National Health
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct
in Research Involving Humans, specifically the notes on the human fetus and the
use of human fetal tissue (Supplementary Note 5) and the guidelines for the ethical review of human SCGT and related therapies (Supplementary Note 7). The
NHMRC established by the NHMRC Act 1992 (Cth.) is charged with setting
down ethical guidelines for research and requires all institutions or organizations
that receive funding from it to do research to establish human research ethics
committees (HRECs) and to subject all research involving humans whether
relating to health or not and whether funded by the NHMRC or not to ethical
review by HRECs using the statement and supplementary notes as the standard.
-

-

-

-

-
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While these ethical guidelines are just that guidelines the new Commonwealth Acts make certain prohibited acts and offences punishable by imprisonment. Turning then to the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.),
section three sets out the object of the Act:
-

-

to address concerns, including ethical concerns, about scientific developments in relation to human reproduction and the utilisation of human embryos by prohibiting certain
practices. (italics added)
It is within this Act that we find the most comprehensive prohibitions in relation to 1GM. While the general prohibition against cloning falls at the margins
of what we might describe as 1GM, other prohibited practices in the Act are
more clearly aimed at 1GM. At first blush, one might view these provisions as
intended to curtail the production of a radically-modified human being a
hybrid or chimera or trans-human. However, a more considered look suggests
that there is also a concern with what might be viewed as deviant reproduction.
As stated earlier this seems to be tied to what we would argue is a mistaken correlation between human kinship relationships and how they are worked out at
the sub-cellular level.
We should be wary of the mystification of social relations based on the invisible realm of molecular biology. The critique or embrace of post-humanism
can only be done from the standpoint of embodied persons and the relationships
they develop in the social world It is by foregrounding these relationships when
interpreting the Australian Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.), for
example, that we are able to reveal what may even be unconscious assumptions
about the nature or naturalness of reproduction. Those assumptions catch us in
a questionable feedback loop where what is viewed as unnatural is already predetermined by particular views about the way reproduction should proceed,
namely, sexually between one man and one woman. Consider Section 13:
-

-

a

-

A person commits an offence if the person intentionally creates a human embryo by a
process other than the fertilsation of a human egg by a human sperm, or intentionally
develops a human embryo so created.
It is clear that some kind of interpretive work needs to be done to assess what
the words "a process other than" are alluding to. By foregrounding the relationships or embodied identities that must be involved in any process aimed at the
creation or development of an embryo, we can see that a requirement for male
to female reproduction is being legislated. One of the ways in which the legislation masks this objective is by disembodying the human gametes that are being
regulated. The legislation reads as if it had been written from the perspective of
a fiber-optic telescope or a laparoscope. If we were to insist upon a perspective
that embodies the gametes, the legislation might read quite differently.
This is further reinforced by the fact that the provision starts by referring to
the creation of a human embryo whereas hybrid embryos are specifically dealt

with elsewhere (Section 20). Further, a human embryo is defined in the Act as
"a live embryo that has a human genome or an altered human genome and that
has been developing for less than 8 weeks since the appearance of two pro-nuclei
or the initiation of its development by other means" (italics added). A hybrid
embryo, on the other hand, is defined as an embryo created by the fertilization
of a human egg by animal sperm, or vice versa, and various other possible
chimerical combinations. Clearly, then, what is specifically being policed in this
section are deviant forms of human reproduction: non-heterosexual reproduction that transfers genetic heritage. Interestingly, the Canadian legislation does
not do this. In other words, it does not mandate a particular kind of reproduction. On its face, the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act, does not
appear to contain a provision similar to Section 13.
This conclusion is particularly interesting in light of a recent book by Bryan
Sykes, Professor of Genetics at Oxford University, entitled Adam's Curse. 55 He
predicts the extinction of men unless we can create a designer male gene. He
suggests that because of the weakness and singularity of the chromosome and
the capacity of the two X chromosomes to "pair up and swap genes to minimize
bad mutations," the solution might be to fuse genetic material from two women:
the DNA could be extracted from the nucleus of one woman's egg, and made
to fuse with the DNA inside another woman's egg. "56 For him, it is a matter of
survival of the species, but for now, in Australia at least, such homosexual
reproduction is not allowed.
Section 15 of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.) takes a
further step in policing deviant reproduction. It states "a person commits an
offence if the person intentionally creates or develops a human embryo containing genetic material provided by more than two persons." Not only is homosexual reproduction banned, but reproduction must continue to be monogamous
even at the genetic level. While we know that there may be dangers to any procedure that involves introducing genetic material into a cell, it is not the safety or
ethical application of the procedure that is being policed here. Section 15 is a
blanket prohibition against use of genetic material from more than two people
in any circumstances. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is the one
area where 1GM has already occurred. Micro-implantation techniques already
in use make it possible to compensate for mitochondrial genetic diseases either
through inserting segments of healthy mitochondria (ooplasmic transplantation) or placing the nucleus of the egg of a woman suffering from the disease
into a substitute egg (in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation). It is still unclear
whether this technology is safe, as there has not been adequate testing. Therefore
it would be unethical and premature to allow these techniques to be used on
humans as therapeutic procedures, despite the use of this technology to produce 30 babies in 1997, which was reported by research scientists from Saint
Barnabas in 2001. The report describes the process and indicates that the babies
that have resulted have indeed inherited the mitochondrial DNA from the
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donor cytoplasm, and will likely produce offspring who will also inherit those
genes.57 These babies have genetic material from three rather than two people.
In the context of the Australian legislation, one has to ask again why this particular kind of procedure has been singled out and separately prohibited.58
Interestingly, there is no legislation in Australia prohibiting a baby from
having three biological progenitors, as opposed to three genetic progenitors. A
woman who gestates a baby created from a donor egg makes no genetic contribution to that baby, but nevertheless has a significant biological input through
gestation. She nourishes the baby with nutrients produced through her own circulatory system, she carries the baby inside her womb, and the baby is subject to
the same environmental changes, positive or negative, to which the woman herself is subjected. Yet the law does not prohibit these exchanges, provided they are
not predicated on monetary exchange. 59 In light of the Prohibition of Human
Cloning Act 2002 (Cth.), and Section 15 described above, if all three people had
instead wished to contribute genetic material to the baby, the law would prohibit
the exchange.
Another important section in the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002
(Cth.) reads as follows:
A person commits an offence if
(a) the person alters the genome of a human cell in such away that the alteration is heritable by descendants of the human whose cell was altered; and
(b) in altering the genome, the person intended the alteration to be heritable by
descendants of the human whose cell was altered.
in this section: human cell includes a human embryonal cell, a human fetal cell,
human sperm, or a human egg. (Section 18)
This section specifically targets 1GM, but what is particularly interesting is that
only intentional 1GM is prohibited. The legislation is drafted in a way that is
clearly concerned not to prohibit SCGT which, some might argue, runs a very
small risk of altering the germ line.60 What it does do, however, is countenance
the possibility of heritable change occurring through chance. Change by design
is not allowed, but change by accident is. Perhaps this would satisfy those who
perceive the problem as related to certain people being allowed to "design in"
advantage. If instead the only way in which 1GM could occur is if it occurs by
accident, then the advantages accrued would be limited to those that have the
natural advantage of being the one (in however many thousands) whose germ
cells were affected by the modification.
At the same time as the passing of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act
2002 (Cth.), the Federal government also passed the Research Involving
Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth.). This Act basically sets down rules about how
and when an embryo can be used for research purposes. In summary, it limits
research only to those embryos created for reproductive purposes that are in

Regulating 1GM, or policing the fertile scientific imagination?

excess of what is required by the reproducing progenitors. Licenses that authorize damage or destruction of an embryo so created are allowed under strict
conditions and only with respect to embryos created before 5 April 2002. This
time limited provision is, however, repealed as of 5 April 2005. The NHMRC
also plays a crucial role under the legislation of approving and monitoring the
licensing of the use of excess embryos.
Like its counterpart, the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth.)
also defines a human embryo as "a live embryo that has a human genome or an
altered human genome and that has been developing for less than 8 weeks since
the appearance of two pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development by other
means." We presume that the inclusion in both Acts of an embryo with an
altered human genome within the definition of human embryo aims to cover
those embryos that may have been genetically altered in their somatic cell lines
through in utero processes. It also may be directed at covering non-intentional
1GM as countenanced in Section 18 (1) (b) of the Prohibition of Human Cloning
Act 2002 (Cth.). Given that any other kind of alteration is prohibited, it is
unlikely that what is being imagined here is an embryo with an intentionallyaltered germ line. However, it is reassuring that were such an embryo to be produced and developed, it would be legally considered to have the status of
"human embryo" despite its non-legal creation.
As mentioned above, alongside the prohibitory legislation, and operating
in tandem therewith, are research guidelines set down by the NHMRC. The
NHMRC has recently issued guidelines which mirror the federal legislation. The
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and
Research (the Guidelines) are intended to provide comprehensive rules governing activities relating to reproductive technology in clinical practice; research
aimed at improving outcomes in clinical practice; and other research involving
the use of human gametes, embryos, embryonic stem cells, fetuses, and fetal
cells. 61
It is interesting to note that the Guidelines do note the desirability of 1GM
where it precludes passing on a genetic disorder. It is suggested as a goal of contemporary reproductive technologies that couples avoid passing on a heritable
genetic disorder. However, PGD rather than 1GM is considered appropriate
where a serious genetic condition or disease (including serious chromosome
abnormalities not associated with a known condition or disease) is in question.
A single thread that is woven throughout the Guidelines is the right of a person
to know the identities of their genetic parents. This point is presented as an
assumption, and is raised in every context where donation of gametes or embryos
is examined. Given that one of the possible results of 1GM in some contexts is
the opportunity for more than two genetic progenitors, it is worth asking how
law and social discourse would manage this multiplicity of parental possibilities. Perhaps this is another reason why, so far it, has been directly excluded as a
possibility in the Australian legislation.
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11.5

The legal response in Canada

In response to growing public concerns about new reproductive and genetic
technologies, the Government of Canada appointed the Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies in October 1989. In November 1993, under an
"ethic of care" framework '62 the Royal Commission made public 293 recommen
dations, concluding that "decisive, timely, and comprehensive national action is
required with respect to the regulation of new reproductive technologies, 1163 In
particular, the Royal Commission called for legislation to set clear boundaries
around acceptable and non-acceptable uses of ARTs and genetic technologies,
and to regulate and monitor the use of acceptable practices and developments in
this field. To achieve this goal, the Royal Commission stated that the federal government should use its power under the Criminal Code to prohibit practices that
"because of their unsafe or unethical character (are) considered unacceptable
under any circumstances."64 In addition, the Royal Commission recommended
the establishment of a national regulatory commission charged with the responsibility of setting and enforcing standards for those practices deemed acceptable.
The Canadian government's final response to the Royal Commission is An
Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research (AHR Act)
which was given royal assent on 29 March 2004.65 In 1996, Bill C-47, An Act
Respecting Human Reproductive Technologies and Commercial Transactions
Relating to Human Reproduction, was proposed.66 Bill C-47 contained a list of
prohibited activities which included, amongst others, implanting animal embryos
into humans or vice versa; fusing human and animal zygotes or embryos; maintaming human embryos outside the human body (beyond the 14-day limit);
germ-line alterations; fertilizing animals with human sperm, or vice versa; and
retrieving the ovum or sperm from a fetus or cadaver with the intention of maturing it. Under the various pressures of an upcoming federal election, the proposed
regime failed to materialize, and Bill C-47 died on the order paper in 1997.
Unlike Bill C-47 which was exclusively prohibitory in nature, the AHR Act
combines both criminal prohibitions with a regulatory framework. Since the
original Bill C-47 died, and the introduction of the AHR Act, significant
changes have occurred in the development of reproductive and genetic technologies. Notable among these changes is the growing interest in stem cell
research and the increased use of IV}-related technologies. These changes, as
well as a shift in attitude towards these technologies, are reflected in the AHR
Act. Where the preamble of Bill C-47 began with an expression of grave concern "about the significant threat to human dignity, the risks to human health
and safety, both known and unknown, and other serious social and ethical
issues posed by certain reproductive and genetic technologies' the declaration
of principles in the AHR Act provides that:
the benefits of assisted human reproductive technologies and related research for individuals, families and for society in general can be most effectively secured by taking
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appropriate measures for the protection and promotion of human health, safety, dignity
and rights in the use of these technologies and in related research.
Another difference between Bill C-47 and the AHR Act is that the former
contained a set of legislative objectives. Although the AHR Act is silent about
the objectives of the legislation, information published by Health Canada at
the time that precursor draft legislation was introduced states that it has two
primary objectives: first, to "ensure that Canadians using assisted human reproduction techniques do so without compromising their health and safety' and
second, to "ensure that promising research involving human reproductive
materials takes place within a regulated environment. "67 This second purpose,
while not overtly expressed in the text of the draft legislation, appears to inform
many of the activities that would be controlled through license under the Bill.
Rather than a statement of objectives, the AHR Act contains a declaration of
principles that informs the Act and guides lawmakers in interpreting and
implementing the legislation. Notable principles set out in the Bill include:
The Parliament of Canada recognizes and declares that:
(a) the health and well-being of children born through the application of assisted
human reproductive technologies must be given priority in all decisions respecting
their use
(c) while all persons are affected by these technologies, women more than men are
directly and significantly affected by their application and the health and wellbeing of women must be protected in the application of these technologies
(e) persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be discrimmated against, including on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status
(g) human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome, must
be preserved and protected.
Because these principles are enshrined in a statutory declaration, they have
greater legal force than if they were set out in a preamble to the legislation. As
stated earlier, principle c is significant and noteworthy in its deliberate recognition of the unique position that women occupy in relation to the application of
reproductive and genetic technologies. As far as we can determine, Canada is
unique among nations in signaling that women, more than men, are impacted
by the development and use of reproductive and genetic technologies. How this
principle will be interpreted, and therefore the direct effect that it will have on
decisions about applications of the technologies, remains to be seen. However,
its inclusion as a statutory principle means that courts interpreting this legislation will be called upon to take seriously and account for the embodied and
social situatedness of women in relation to the use of such technologies in both
the reproductive and research context.
Principle e of the AHRAct, which provides that "persons who seek to undergo
assisted reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against, including
on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status' is noteworthy in light
of the comments made above in relation to the Australian legislation. Whereas
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one of the unstated, but nonetheless we argue animating, concerns in Australia
is the regulation, indeed prohibition, of homosexual reproduction, it is important to ask whether similar procedures, if performed in Canada, would or could
escape prohibition where they conflict with this principle. This is not to suggest
that procedures that would facilitate homosexual reproduction and that might
be rightfully regulated due to health and safety concerns would be forced to be
on offer. But one could argue that where the safety of such procedures had been
demonstrated, their use could not be prohibited solely because they facilitated
homosexual reproduction.
Finally, the inclusion of principle g in the AHR Act, which provides that
"human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome,
must be preserved and protected" highlights the individual as worthy of protection and objectifies the human genome as worthy of the same. While at first
blush this principle looks to be reinforcing a liberal humanist conception of the
bounded individual while simultaneously clinging to the fiction of the human
genome, one could argue that this principle reflects a healthy ambivalence and
tension about both entities and concepts. The Canadian legislation draws
attention to the issue of diversity which may be important in developing an
interpretation in line with the feminist arguments developed in this chapter.
At best, diversity, as set out in this principle, is of equal importance to human
individuality and the integrity of the human genome. Arguably then, novel
forms are also worthy of protection when they contribute to diversity. According
to more conventional interpretations, interests of diversity such as sexual preference, disability, race, and color are also to be protected in the application of
the reproductive and genetic technologies regulated by the legislation.
As stated earlier, the AHR Act identifies both prohibited and controlled activities. Those activities prohibited under the legislation include creating a human
clone or transplanting a human clone into a human being; creating in vitro
embryos for any purposes other than creating a human being; improving or
providing instruction in assisted human reproductive procedures, germ-line
genetic alteration of a cell of a human being, or in vitro embryo such that the
alteration is capable of being transmitted to descendants; transplanting a sperm,
ovum, embryo, or fetus of a non-human into a human being; for the purpose of
creating a human, using any human reproductive material or any in vitro embryo
that is or was transplanted into a non-human; creating hybrids for the purpose
of reproduction; or transplanting a hybrid into a human or non-human. While
most of these prohibitions cover the same procedures banned in the Australian
context and are motivated by a similar aim to curtail the production of a
radically-modified human being, a hybrid, or a chimera there are several notable
differences. On its face, the AHR Act does not appear to contain a provision similar to that section in the Australian Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002
(Cth.) which prohibits the intentional creation of a human embryo by a process
other than the fertilization of a human egg by a human sperm, or the intentional

development of a human embryo so created. Thus, while the Canadian legislation
is animated by a fear of species transgression and a concern about cloning
(asexual production), it is less concerned about homosexual reproduction.
For purposes of the AHR Act, chimera means "(a) an embryo into which a
cell of any non-human life form has been introduced or (b) an embryo that
consists of cells of more than one embryo, fetus or human being." While hybrid
is defined as a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human
life form, or into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been
introduced, it also includes an ovum of a non-human life form that has been
fertilized by a human sperm, or into which the nucleus of a human cell has
been introduced. Finally, the definition of hybrid in the AHR Act also includes
a human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains
haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life
form. Accordingly, the AHR Act's prohibition on the creation of hybrids is very
strong.
The same is not true of the prohibition on the creation of chimeras. As Jason
Scott Robert notes: "the definition of 'chimera' in the AHR Act does not capture
the insertion of human cells into non-human embryos, or the implantation of
a creature so created in a human or non-human life form." He goes on to
explain that "according to the AHR Act, it is prohibited to insert non-human
cells into human embryos or to insert human cells into human embryos, while
it is not prohibited to insert human cells into non-humans."" Unless this omission is an oversight, the most likely explanation for this kind of transgenesis is
the creation of human-to-animal chimeras to be used to conduct research on
human biology, as Robert argues. What is striking about the AHR Act, therefore, is that while the creation of human-to-human chimeras is prohibited, the
coming into being of novel beings, provided they involve the insertion of
human cells into non-human embryos, is not. While at first glance, what
appears to motivate most of the prohibitions in the AHR Act is a desire to protect the sexual conjugation of human gametes with the result being genetic
recombination with its unpredictability of a new phenotype, what is also permitted is the limited exercise of the scientific imagination provided it protects
the boundaries of the liberal legal subject.

11.6

New genetic futures: a postmodern feminist
legal ethics

-

-

In the new genetic future then, so-called "natural maternity" is increasingly
undermined by moves toward deviant reproduction, be it homosexual, asexual,
monosexual, or clinical. Bart Simon describes the postmodern subject as "an
unstable, impure mixture without discernable origins; a hybrid, a cyborg?'69 It
is this same subject that conservatives fear we will become if reproduction is
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"dc-naturalized." For instance Joan Didur argues, "[g] enetic engineering in the
lab is represented as a violent assault on nature and a form of contamination
invading the otherwise pure and untainted boundaries of the body of the liberal subject."7° Liberal subjectivity depends on the exclusion of the other and
the capacity to insist upon an autonomous, individuated "I." This kind of "1/'
however, cannot be sustained by many of us when we are pregnant or live with
a disability; for example. Rather, in these contexts subjecthood has to accommodate the other. This, we argue, is not a bad thing. On the contrary, dependency and connection are inevitable relations for us all. If our conception of
selthood was not limited to untainted bounded bodies but instead incorporated dependency and transgression, we suggest we would have a more just
society.7' It is precisely those people whose embodiment transgresses the liberal
norm who are the most disempowered in our society. Katherine Hayles argues
for instance that "what is lethal is not the post-human as such but the grafting
of the post-human onto a liberal humanist view of the self."" It is this very
liberal humanist view of the self that permeates legal thinking.
Against this liberal view of seithood, Shildrick argues "the postmodernist
approach necessitates an ethic of openness and responsibility towards differences
where none is given prior privilege
acknowledgement of difference deconstructs any reliance on subject/object distinctions, and uncovers the assumption
of the subjective autonomy as a mechanism to police boundaries." Shildrick
confronts the inviolability of the liberal self with "the leakiness between one's
self and others
While critics of the unstable subject of postmodern theory
charge postmodern feminism with an ethics of arbitrariness not far removed
from nihilism, we argue to the contrary that postmodern feminism is not lacking in ethics, but instead has an ethics radically at odds with the ethic of liberal
individualism or humanism. We affirm (with Shildrick) the basis for a more
appropriate ethic is a "responsibility towards differences not as the disembodied
site of diverse claims, but as an awareness of the irreducible but fluid bodily
investments which ground our own provisional being in the world and our
interaction with others."74
The same concerns are echoed by Marilyn Strathern, and Margaret Davies
and Ngaire Naffine. Franklin describes Strathern, for instance, as interested in
the way that Western knowledge practices operate to rework the inevitable
interconnections of bodies and identities through forms of possessive individualism.75 This is similar to the analysis that Davies and Naffine offer of legal
understandings of identity. As they write: "our jurisprudential understanding
of the person is that of a proprietor of self and of the external world. In modern Western law, to own is to be. We are quintessentially possessive individuals."76 Interestingly, however, this does not translate into a property right over
the self. Indeed, as Davies and Naffine argue, the "dogmatic legal position is that
persons are not property." 77 To be constituted as property raises the possibility
..

...

of becoming the property of another, and that would not accord with
autonomous liberal selthood.
It is one of those disturbing paradoxes of liberal identity, therefore, that in
order to retain one's subjecthood, identified by Davies and Naffine as the person
as mind, there must be individual control of one's object body. It is the boundaries of our bodies therefore that must be relentlessly and vigilantly policed.
But this view of the self as a unitary, bounded, self-possessing autonomous
individual fails to account for myriad relations of dependency and interconnection. Davies and Naffine argue that:
the person does not have to be viewed as a unitary, bounded, self possessing autonomous
individual, always in command of his own being and always able to exclude others. The
relationship of the pregnant woman to her foetus reveals just some of the failings of this
view. So too does the relationship of persons in the acts of sexual intercourse. 78
With the development of 1GM we are challenging liberal selfhood in its very
production. There is something fundamentally disruptive for liberal selfhood
in the congruence of boundary transgression through reproduction that the
manipulation of genetic identity brings about. While some have described this
transgressivity as giving rise to the post-human, we want to make a clear distinction between critical post-humanism a variant of postmodernism hinted
at in our discussion of Hayles above and extropianism, the completion of the
enlightenment project and the perfection of the liberal self. This latter posthumanist project is susceptible to an apocalyptic outcome. Liberal selfhood
and transgressive or hybrid selthood can only go together to the detriment of
those who cannot transcend their interconnected subjectivity. Indeed the likely
outcome of the liberal self-grafted onto the transhuman is the feminist
nightmare of reproduction co-opted to the needs of global capital, producing
genetically-engineered hybrids that are compliant corporate citizens. However,
as Simon asks, are "revulsion, rejection and exclusion the only viable modes of
resistance to corporate techno scientific practice"?"
Any post-humanist future worthy of embrace needs to be carefully distinguished from one that simply attempts to actualize the liberal humanist fantasy
of the self. That self typically aims to transcend its material limits. Critical posthumanism, on the other hand, emphasizes that being human means being
embodied. It offers the possibility of breaking out of the constraints that liberal
humanism has placed on being human. 1GM also offers emancipatory potential in its refusal to close the parenthesis of relationship and kinship. The resulting transgressive kinship can become a step towards the recognition of a
plurality of relationships and forms of kinship. What needs to be critiqued
more fully is the impulse to limit legal and social recognition to kinship ties of
a restrictive type.
-

-
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inheritable genetic modification: clinical
applications and genetic counseling
considerations
Joan A. Scott

It is entirely speculative at this point whether technologies to alter the human
germ line will develop to the point where they are deemed safe and effective
enough to be made available to prospective parents, much less considered ethically acceptable. But even the possibility that such profound technologies might
be used has prompted intense debate. The scientific, ethical, moral, and social
issues raised by these technologies have been debated in this volume and elsewhere. Missing in the discussion thus far, however, have been the perspectives of
the couples or individuals who might consider the use of such technologies, consideration of the clinical or research setting in which these technologies might be
offered, and the impact of that setting on couples, or the perspectives and concerns of the health professionals and researchers who may be in the position of
counseling the families and providing the services. Additionally, the public has
not yet been invited into the discussion in any meaningful way. In the interest of
extending the debate, this discussion will try to anticipate some of the patient,
genetic counseling, and application aspects of technologies developed to alter
the human germ line and articulate the need to include many more voices and
perspectives in the debate. Some may consider this discussion premature, perhaps even inappropriate at this point in time, but given the speed with which
scientific progress is made, it seems prudent to at least introduce these issues
into the debate.

12.1 The application of inheritable genetic modification
technologies to humans
When will bench and animal research have progressed to the point that
human clinical trials of inheritable genetic modification (1GM) might be
considered ethically justifiable, at least from the technical standpoint? Some
believe that there will never be enough data to feel confident of the safety of
1GM in humans. In the 2000 report of the American Association for the
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